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Abstract
We extend the standard intergenerational mobility literature by modelling individual outcomes
as a function of the whole history of parental income, using data from Norway. We find that,
conditional on permanent income, education is maximized when income is balanced between the
early childhood and middle childhood years. In addition, there is an advantage to having income
occur in late adolescence rather than in early childhood. These result are consistent with a model
of parental investments in children with multiple periods of childhood, income shocks, imperfect
insurance, dynamic complementarity, and uncertainty about the production function and the ability
of the child.
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Research Council of Norway for financial support. Tominey acknowledges the Research Council for
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1 Introduction
There is a large empirical literature examining the intergenerational transmission of economic status
(for recent surveys see Solon (1999), Black and Devereux (2011), Bjo¨rklund and Salvanes (2011)).
It is possible to find estimates of intergenerational mobility for various outcomes, and for virtually
every country in the world where data linking parents and children is available. Most estimates come
from simple models relating a measure of child income and a measure of parental income, such as:
yc = α + βyp + u, (1)
where yc is a measure of the child’s income, yp is a measure of parental income, and u is a residual.
Standard economic models of intergenerational transmission justify the use of equation (1) (e.g.,
Becker and Tomes (1979), Becker and Tomes (1986)), but they collapse the childhood years to a single
period of life. More realistic models of parental investments in children distinguish several stages of
childhood (e.g., Cunha and Heckman (2007), Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010), Cunha (2013),
Caucutt and Lochner (2012)). They point out that the whole history (in particular, the timing) of
parental investments in children may be as or more important that the total amount invested during
the childhood years. This means that the timing of income may be as or more important than a
single measure of income, and that the model of equation (1) may be misspecified.
This paper extends the literature on intergenerational transmission by examining the relationship
between adult outcomes of children and the timing of parental income during their childhood years,
using administrative data from Norway. Our main outcome of interest is the child’s education (al-
though we also look at other variables). To reduced the dimensionality of the problem, we divide
childhood in three periods: early (ages 0-5), middle (ages 6-11) and late (ages 12-17).1 We find that
the timing of income matters, over and above permanent income.
A simple way to present our findings is to describe what happens to education when income is
shifted from one period of childhood to another. We show that, as family income in early childhood
rises and as income in middle childhood falls, an individual’s level of education first increases and
then decreases. This means that the child’s schooling is maximized when income is balanced across
these two periods, rather than when it is concentrated in just one of them.
This is an inverse U-shaped relationship between income in a period and final educational achieve-
ment, which is also observed (but less pronounced) when we examine the trade-offs between income
in early and late childhood, and income in middle and late childhood. In particular, among children
of richer families, schooling tends to increase when we shift income from early to late childhood.
These empirical patterns are consistent with a model with income uncertainty, partial insurance
(Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)), and complementarity between investments in children
across periods (Cunha and Heckman (2007), Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010)). Income
1Our results are robust to dividing childhood into more periods.
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uncertainty, together with partial insurance possibilities, leads to a setting where investments in
children react to parental income shocks. Complementarity between investments taking place in
different periods means that human capital is maximized when there is a balanced flow of investments.
The combination of these factors can result in a model where a balanced flow of income shocks may
lead to higher human capital than an unbalanced history of shocks. This would be consistent with
an inverse U-shaped relationship between the education of the child and the amount of income that
is frontloaded (or backloaded) in the initial (middle) period of childhood.2
Finally, if there is uncertainty about a child’s ability, or about the parameters of the production
function of skill, but if parents learn about either one (or both) of these over time, then there could be
an incentive to delay investments until more of this uncertainty is resolved. If that was the case then
the late childhood years could be periods where parents are more prone to invest and consequently
especially sensitive to income shocks.3
Our analysis has three main components. The first one is descriptive, where we document the
association between different patterns of timing of parental income and the education (and other adult
outcomes) of children. We expand equation (1), by replacing the single regressor yp with multiple
measures of income, measured at different stages of childhood. In order to do this we need data
on the entire family income history for a large number of children, which is rarely available. We
use data from Norwegian registries for children born during the 1970s, which allows us to link an
individual’s outcomes as a young adult to the whole history of parental income during the childhood
and adolescence years.
Second, we assess the extent to which we can interpret the association between the child’s educa-
tion and the timing of parental income as causal. We face two (related) challenges. On one end, the
timing of income could be a choice variable, potentially correlated with investments in children. For
example, there are periods when parents take time off work to take care of their children, such as in
the case of maternity leave. On the other end, there is heterogeneity across parents, which can be
simultaneously related with income profiles and investments in children. For example, parents with
steep income profiles may provide very different parenting from those with flat income profiles.
One way to address some of these issues, at least partially, is to use only father’s income, which
is less subject to endogenous fluctuations than total family (or mother’s) income. In addition, we
control for a rich set of variables: permanent father’s income (measured either during the child’s life,
or the entire life of the father), parental education interacted with parental age and the individual
specific slope of the income profile (computed from father’s earnings measured before the birth of
the child, and after she turns 18). We also assess the robustness of our findings to the inclusion
2However, this type of dynamic complementarity in parental investments is not strictly required to produce this
pattern. Other models where parents have a desire to smooth out parental investments over time (because of technology
or preferences) would be able to produce it.
3It is plausible that this revelation of uncertainty does not affect the trade-off between income in adjacent periods
(early vs middle, and middle vs late) as much as the trade-off between income in more distant periods (early vs late),
since much more learning takes place between distant periods than between adjacent periods.
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of divorce and fertility episodes experienced in the family during an individual’s entire childhood.
Finally, we document that there is no association between the timing of income and the birthweight
of the child, which suggests that the timing of income is not correlated with time invariant unobserved
heterogeneity affecting this dimension of child quality.
It is however true that, even if we can convincingly tackle the issues just discussed, we cannot rule
out the possibility that we are capturing the effect of the timing of other shocks, which are correlated
with the timing of income shocks (such as, for example, parental illness). In that case, we would have
to interpret our estimates more broadly as giving us the impact of the timing of parental shocks,
which could include income shocks, but also other shocks correlated with shocks to income.
Third, we examine whether the empirical patterns we uncover can be explained by economic
models of parental investments in children, with multiple periods of childhood. A simple model
without uncertainty is not compatible with our empirical findings, because it predicts that it is never
worse to have all income available in early childhood than to have it distributed across early and late
periods of childhood. Therefore, we discuss models with income uncertainty, and uncertainty about
the ability of the child, and pay particular attention to the roles of credit (and insurance) markets
and the technology of skill production in these models.
A few other authors have explicitly examined the role of the timing of income in the formation
of human capital. Some of these focus on survey data from the US and Germany, and rely on
relatively small datasets (Duncan, Yeung, Brooks-gunn, and Smith (1998), Levy and Duncan (2000),
Jenkins and Schluter (2002), Carneiro and Heckman (2003), Caucutt and Lochner (2012)). Others use
much larger register data for Denmark and Norway (Aakvik, Salvanes, and Vaage (2005), Humlum
(2011)), but nevertheless they estimate very restrictive models. In particular, all these papers estimate
regressions of child outcomes on the income of parents at different ages. Since the levels of income
in different periods enter in a linear and additive way in these models, they are assumed to be
“substitutes” in the production of human capital.
Relative to the papers using US and German survey data our paper relies on much better data
(larger samples and richer income histories), which allows us to estimate much more flexible models
with considerable precision. This is also true when we contrast our analysis to the ones using register
data for Norway and Denmark.
The flexible models we estimate enable us to construct a richer picture of the role of the timing of
income than the one presented in previous work. This is important because the complementarity (or
other interactions) of investments in human capital across periods (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach
(2010)) may translate into complementarity (or other interactions) of income shocks across periods.
Caucutt and Lochner (2012) present an overlapping generations model of parental investments
in children. In addition, Cunha (2013) also presents such a model with overlapping generations and
multiple periods of parental investments, explicitly accounting for uncertainty in income. The model
presented in this paper is much simpler than the models in any of these two papers. It is neither a
general equilibrium model, nor an overlapping generations model, but it serves a much more modest
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purpose - we do not use it to conduct policy simulations, we just use it to check whether it is possible to
explain the main patterns in the data using a parsimonious economic model of parental investments.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the data, and in section 3
we present our empirical methods. Section 4 discusses our empirical results and section 5 examines
potential endogeneity of the timing of income. In section 6 we estimate and simulate simple dynamic
models of parental investments in children which help us interpret the results. Finally, section 7
concludes.
2 Data
Our data source is the Norwegian Registry maintained by Statistics Norway, for the years ranging
from 1971 up to 2006. It is a linked administrative dataset that covers the population of Norway,
and it is a collection of different administrative registers providing information about (among other
things) month and year of birth, educational attainment, labour market status, earnings, a set of
demographic variables (age, gender), as well as information on families including parent’s marital
status. We are able to link individuals to their parents, and it is possible to gather labour market
information for both fathers and mothers.
For the bulk of our analysis we select all births in the period 1971-1980. In particular, we construct
annual paternal taxable earnings data for each year, starting from the three years preceding the
child’s birth, through to their 20th birthday. This gives us information on income data and parental
characteristics, mapped to children’s outcomes, for 522,490 children.
The earnings values for both parents and children include wages and income from business activity,
but also unemployment and sickness benefits. This means that our income measures include some
degree of insurance against low income shocks through social insurance. Therefore, we expect the
effect of the timing of this measure of total earnings to be lower than the effect of labour earnings
alone (which we cannot measure).
We discount all incomes to the year of birth of the child, using a real interest rate of 4.26%
(Aakvik, Salvanes, and Vaage (2005)). However, our results are robust to a large range of fixed
discount rates between 0% and 10%, and to time-varying discount rates (matching the risk free
interest rate evolution during the relevant years for our analysis). In order to construct a measure of
income in each of the three periods we take the average of discounted annual paternal incomes within
each period (0-5, 6-11, 12-17). Permanent income is then defined as the sum of income in the three
periods.
We consider a large range of human capital outcomes. Our data includes years of education for
each individual, an indicator for dropping out of high school at the age of 16, and college enrollment.
The consequences of the early dropout is that individuals do not receive a certificate for vocational or
academic achievement which severely limits opportunities in the labor market, and prohibits access
to further education. Unfortunately, it is not possible to measure whether a college degree was
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completed. Individuals are at least 26 years of age when we observe their educational achievement,
and consequently, most of them can be expected to have exited school.
We also present results for other outcomes such as IQ, teenage pregnancy, health and grades
at school. Military service is compulsory in Norway for males, and between the ages of 18 and 20
males usually take an IQ test. This test is a composite of arithmetic, words,4 and a figures tests5,
all of which are recognized as tests of IQ. We also use a health score taken from the military tests
upon entry to the Army. This test is designed to ascertain physical capabilities of the males. It is
measured on a 9 point scale, with the top score of 9 indicating health sufficient to allow military
service. Around 85% of individuals have the top score. For a set of individuals born predominantly
in 1986 (so a much later cohort than the ones we have considered so far), we observe grades achieved
at the end of the 10th grade, when individuals are aged 16.6 Unfortunately, grades in schools are not
available for earlier cohorts. For teen pregnancy, we construct an indicator for whether an individual
(female) has a child, when she was between the ages of 16 and 20.
Finally, we construct a set of control variables, which are important for the credibility of our
empirical strategy. First, we construct household specific slopes of income profiles, by taking the
difference between household income when the child is aged 18-20, and in the three years before
birth.7 Other controls include parental years of education, parental age at birth, marital status of
parents, and family size. The two latter variables can be measured in each year of the child’s life.
We also observe the year of birth of the child as well as the municipality of residence in each year of
the child’s life.
The descriptive statistics for the sample are reported in Table 1. There are 522,490 child level
observations, which include all individuals born in Norway between 1971 and 1980 for whom we were
able to collect paternal income data, plus those born in 1986. The average permanent income of
the father (in the period between the ages of 0 and 17 of the child) is about £306,100. There is
substantial income dispersion (the standard deviation is £116,900). Income in each period (1, 2, and
3) falls with the age of the child because of discounting.
Mothers have on average 11.14 years of schooling, which is slightly lower than the average years
of education of the fathers (11.45). Mothers are much younger than fathers at birth (26 vs 29 years
of age).
The average years of education of the children in our sample is 12.73. 21% of children drop out
from high school, but 39% attend college. The average annual earnings of these children at age 30 is
£19,930.
Regarding additional child outcomes, IQ is only available for males, and takes values on a 9 point
scale, with a sample average of 5.25, and a standard deviation of 1.79. The average health score for
4The word tests are most similar to the Wechsler Adult Intelligent Scale (WAIS).
5The figures tests are similar to the Raven Progressive matrix.
6See Hægeland, Raaum and Salvanes (2008) for full detail of grade data.
7A robustness check conditions instead for the growth rather than the level difference of pre- and post- childhood
income.
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the males is 8.44, indicating that the majority of children achieve perfect physical health on this scale
(which has a maximum score of 9). Teen pregnancies occur for 8% of the females in our sample.
Finally, the cohort of children for whom we have 10th grade exam information have an average score
of 42.75 (out of 60).
The income process is studied in detail in Carneiro, Salvanes, and Tominey (2015). They find that,
as in many other countries, the income process for Norwegian fathers can be fairly well approximated
by the sum of a random walk (permanent shock) and a low order MA process (temporary shock).
3 Methods
3.1 Empirical Strategy
Let Yi be an outcome for child i (education, high school completion, college attendance, earnings, IQ,
health, teenage pregnancy, grades in high school), measured in late adolescence or young adulthood.
We are interested in Yi as a function of the history of (discounted) paternal income Iit in each period
t (t = 1, 2, 3), and permanent income of the parents, PIi. Since PIi = Ii1 + Ii2 + Ii3 we drop one of
the periods from the model, say Ii1. Therefore, we write:
Yi = m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) + εi (2)
We allow m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) to be a non-parametric function of its arguments. It is important to be
able to estimate a flexible function, and the reason is the following. Parents are faced with income
shocks in each period and in response, decide how much to invest in children (and how much to
consume and save). There is a technology that links the adult human capital of an individual to the
whole history of parental investments in childhood and adolescence. The link between income shocks
and child outcomes, described by equation (2), depends on many factors, including preferences,
technology, information, and the structure of credit markets (insurance possibilities). Therefore,
there are likely to be complex nonlinearities and interactions between the different income measures
included in the model.
We are particularly interested inm2(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) =
∂m(PIi,Ii2,Ii3)
∂Ii2
andm3(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) =
∂m(PIi,Ii2,Ii3)
∂Ii3
.
m2(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) tells us what is the impact on outcome Yi of shifting income from period 1 to period
2, since we keep PIi and Ii3 fixed (and PIi = Ii1 + Ii2 + Ii3). In our empirical section we present a
series of graphs relating Yi and Ii2 (for different outcomes Y ). The graphs will vary depending on the
values of PIi and Ii3 on which we evaluate this function. An analogous interpretation and graphical
representations of results can be given to m3(PIi, Ii2, Ii3).
εi should be interpreted as the unobserved heterogeneity that is left after controlling for permanent
income in the model. We assume that εi has finite conditional variance, E(ε
2
i |PIi, Ii2, Ii3) ≤ C <∞,
and that E(εi|PIi, Ii2, Ii3) = 0. We are interested not in the impact of PI itself on Y , but on the
8
impact of the timing of income (I2 and I3) on Y , after conditioning on PI. In other words, we want
to compare outcomes of children whose parents have the same level of permanent income between
the ages of 0 and 17, but differ in the level of income they experience in each period.
The assumption that E(εi|PIi, Ii2, Ii3) = 0 may be controversial. We would like to interpret Ii2
and Ii3 as income shocks orthogonal to other (unobservable) determinants of outcomes Yi, conditional
on PIi. It is likely that PI absorbs much of the relevant unobserved heterogeneity across parents
(correlated with the overall level of their income), but one may still be concerned that parents facing
different income profiles may be also different in other dimensions.
In order to address this issue we start by excluding maternal income from the model, and rely
only on paternal income to construct (PIi, Ii2, Ii3). Maternal income in each period could be very
much related to decisions of staying at home caring for children instead of work, which is likely to
affect child outcomes (e.g., maternity leave; see Carneiro, Loken and Salvanes, 2015). On the other
end, paternal income is much less likely to be affected by these choices.
In addition, we condition on paternal education interacted with paternal age at birth (by including
dummies for years of education and age at birth interacted with each other). This controls for different
age-education profiles across fathers. Moreover, we construct a measure of paternal income growth
between the ages of 0 and 17 of the child, based on income 1 to 3 years before birth (pre-birth income),
and income 1 to 3 years after age 17 (post-17 income). This means that we explore fluctuations in
income around deterministic age-income profiles which are allowed to vary with education, after
accounting for heterogeneous income growth (and, of course, keeping fixed permanent income). The
remaining controls in the model are maternal age at birth interacted with maternal education, birth
year and gender of the child. Therefore, we extend equation (2) to include a large set of controls (Z):
Yi = m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) + Ziδ + εi (3)
Section 5 provides a detailed discussion of all these concerns.
Our argument is that Ii2 and Ii3 are uncorrelated with εi after conditioning on PIi and all the
controls just mentioned. One implication of this argument is that pre-birth investments should
be uncorrelated with the timing of income, but may still affect child outcomes. We test this by
examining the relationship between having a low birth weight baby and the subsequent timing of
parental income. We show below in section 5 that, although low birth weight is strongly correlated
with PIi, it is uncorrelated with Ii2 and Ii3.
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8We will also present results where we control for marital break up and number of children. In addition, we calculate
income residuals from a regression of income on age-education dummies and father fixed effects. We estimate the role
of the timing of income residuals by including them in equation (3), instead of PIi, Ii2 and Ii3. In section 5 we
repeat several of these arguments, and provide a more detailed discussion of potential violations of the assumption
that E(εi|PIi, Ii2, Ii3Zi) = 0.
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3.2 Multivariate Local Linear Regression
Equation (3) is a partially linear regression model. We implement a two step method for estimating
this model. In the first step we estimate δ (the coefficients on Z) by using a series approximation for
m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3).
9 In the second step we estimate a local linear regression of Yi − Ziδˆ (denoted Y˜i) on
(PIi, Ii2, Ii3).
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We follow Ruppert and Wand (1994) and Fan and Gijbels (1996) when specifying the multivariate
local linear regression estimator. Let Ii = (PIi, Ii2, Ii3) be RZ-valued explanatory variables. Our goal
is to estimate the conditional mean function m(x) = E(Y˜ |I = x) for a vector x. The solution is the
value which minimizes the weighted least squares objective function
n∑
i=1
{
Y˜i − γ − (Ii − x)β
}2
KH(Ii − x)
where H is a 3 by 3 diagonal matrix of bandwidths (with h1, h2 and h3 in the diagonals), andKH(Ii−x)
is the product of three univariate uniform kernel functions, KH(Ii − x) = K1(s1i) ∗K1(s2i) ∗K3(s3i),
with:
Kj(sji) =

0.5 if |sji| ≤ 1
0 otherwise
where s1i =
PIi−x1
h1
, s2i =
Ii2−x2
h2
, s3i =
Ii3−x3
h3
, hj is the bandwidth, and j = {1, 2, 3}.
This results in the local least squares estimator of m(x):
ˆm(x;H) = eT
(
ITxWxIx
)−1
ITxWxY˜
where eT is the vector with 1 in the first entry and 0 in all others, andWx= diag{KH(I1 − x), .., KH(In − x)}
is a weighting function which depends on the kernel.
The choice of kernel is not important for the asymptotic properties of the estimator as long as it
is chosen to be a symmetric, unimodal density, such as the uniform kernel. However, there exists a
trade-off in the choice of the number of observations entering the local kernel regressions, determined
by the bandwidth for each variable, hj. A larger bandwidth increases the bias of the estimate but
reduces the variance. We expect that hj → 0 as n→∞.
9In particular, we approximate m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) as:
m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) = α0 + α1PIi + α2Ii2 + α3Ii3 + α4PI
2
i + α5I
2
i2 + α6I
2
i3
+α7PI
3
i + α8I
3
i2 + α9I
3
i3 + α10PIiIi2 + α11PIiIi3 + α12Ii2Ii3
+α13PI
2
i Ii2 + α14PI
2
i Ii3 + α15I
2
i2Ii3 + ...
(include all two-way and three-way interactions between (PIi, Ii2, Ii3, P I
2
i , I
2
i2, I
2
i3, P I
3
i , I
3
i2, I
3
i3)). Then we can estimate
equation (3) by least squares.
10The standard Robinson (1989) method is computationally cumbersome in our setting because of the large size of
our dataset.
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We use the following formula to choose our bandwidth, for each covariate Ij:
hj = C ∗ 2 ∗ σxjh
−1
7 (4)
where C denotes a constant and σxj the standard deviation of component j of vector I. We allow C
to vary between 2 and 6, in order to examine the robustness of our results to the choice of bandwidth.
Finally, we calculate the standard errors using the formula from Ruppert and Wand (1994).
v̂ar {mˆ(x,H)|I1, .., In)} =
{
n−1|H|−12 R(K)/f(x)
}
v(x)
where R(K) =
´
KH(s)
2ds, f(x) denotes the conditional density of x and v(x) = V ar(Y˜ |I = x)
denotes the conditional variance of the outcome.11 We estimate the conditional density and variance
in this equation as follows:
f̂(x) =
1
nhd
n∑
i=1
1
h1h2h3
K
(
PIi − x1
h1
,
Ii2 − x2
h2
,
Ii3 − x3
h3
)
v̂(x) = eT
(
ITxWxIx
)−1
ITxWxˆ
2
where ˆ2 = Y˜i − m̂(x).
4 Results
4.1 Parametric Estimates
We first present basic patterns from parametric regressions which serve as a benchmark for our semi-
parametric analysis. We start with a simple version of equation (2) where we ignore the timing
of income, and consider only the relationship between an outcome of the child, Y , and the perma-
nent income of the father, PI. This is comparable to what is commonly done in the literature on
intergenerational mobility, which regresses the child outcome on a single measure of parental income.
Although it is usual to estimate linear models, here we allow for a more flexible specification.
Instead of including PI linearly in the model, we construct indicator variables, qkPI,i, which take
value 1 if the paternal permanent income of individual i is in percentile k of its distribution in the
sample, with k = 1, ..., 100:
Yi =
100∑
k=1
φkPIq
k
PI,i + εi (5)
The empirical results in this paper are presented through a series of graphs. We focus on years
of education as the outcome of interest, and briefly mention some results for other outcomes. Figure
11In principle one would need a degrees of freedom adjustment to these formulas in order to account for the fact that
we have use the sample to estimate the coefficients on the control variables (Z). However, given the enormous sample
size we are using, such adjustment would be irrelevant, and we ignore it in our calculations.
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1 plots the relationship between measures of schooling attainment of the child and paternal income,
constructed from estimates of equation (5). The relationship between years of schooling and PI
is monotonically increasing (except for very high values of PI) and concave. Doubling permanent
paternal income from £200,000 to £400,000 (which roughly corresponds to moving from the very
bottom of the distribution to the median)12 roughly translates into one additional year of schooling
for the child. High school dropout rates are declining with PI for values of PI below £400,000 (the
57th percentile of the distribution of PI), and they are flat after that. College attendance rates
increase substantially throughout the support of PI.13
We now introduce into the model income during two periods of childhood, defined by ages 6-11
and ages 12-17 (leaving out income occurring at ages 0-5, because of collinearity). Take a version
of equation (3) where the function m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) is additively separable in its three arguments:
m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) = m
1(PIi) + m
2(Ii2) + m
3(Ii3). We approximate m
1(PIi) using dummies for each
percentile of the distribution of PI, and we proceed analogously for m2(Ii2) and m
3(Ii3). In other
words, we estimate the following model:
Yi =
100∑
k1=1
φk1PIq
k1
PI,i +
100∑
k2=1
φk2I2 q
k2
I2,i
+
100∑
k3=1
φk3I3 q
k3
I3,i
+ Ziδ + εi (6)
where qk1PI,i is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the father of child i has permanent income in
percentile k1 of the distribution of PI and 0 otherwise. q
k2
I2,i
and qk3I3,i are defined analogously for the
other two measures of income.
As before, our main focus is on the years of education of the child. Figure 2 has two panels,
corresponding to plots of m2(Ii2) and m
3(Ii3) (all other variables are evaluated at their means).
For the outcome years of schooling, both m2(Ii2) and m
3(Ii3) have an inverse-U shape. This
means that years of education are maximized when there is balance between paternal income across
periods. It is not desirable (in terms of schooling attainment) to have all father’s income concentrated
in one period of childhood, regardless of whether it is ages 0-5, 6-11, or 12-17. Below we discuss why
this might be the case. Our results are similar when we consider alternative measures of educational
attainment: high school dropout or college attendance.
We can test and reject that m2(Ii2) (m
3(Ii3)) does not vary with Ii2 (Ii3). In particular, we test
whether the coefficients φk2I2 (φ
k3
I3
) are all equal to each other, across different values of k2(k3). We
reject this hypothesis even when we drop from the test the coefficients φk2I2 (φ
k3
I3
) corresponding to the
12From the 4th to the 57th percentile to be precise.
13In Appendix Figure A1 we show several panels, plotting estimates of equation (5) for each of the remaining
outcomes in the paper. Log earnings at age 30 and IQ rise steeply with PI for values of PI below £400,000, and much
more slowly after that. The basic pattern is somewhat similar for teenage pregnancy. Estimates for the health index
are erratic but roughly display an increasing relation with PI. Finally, high school grades are increasing in PI. All
these panels display a positive correlation between PI and several outcomes, and the magnitudes of the relationships
between these outcomes and PI are very substantial.
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extremes of the support of Ii2 (Ii3).
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We now turn to our main results, generated from the semi-parametric estimation of m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3)
(allowing the function to be non-separable in its arguments). We document that the main patterns
of Figure 2 are robust to the estimation of a more flexible model.
4.2 Semi Parametric Estimates
In this section we present semi-parametric estimates of m(PI, I2, I3), following the method described
in section 3.2. In order to implement the estimator we first need to create a grid of evaluation points
for m(PI, I2, I3). We take 19 points for each income variable (PI, I2, I3), corresponding to the ventiles
of each variable’s distribution. This gives us a tri-dimensional grid with 6,859 points (= 19 ∗ 19 ∗ 19).
It is standard practice to trim the data so to avoid spurious results driven by small cells. Therefore,
we drop 2% of the sample, corresponding to the cells with the smallest number of observations. In
our main results we use a uniform kernel and choose the bandwidths using the formula in equation
(4), setting C = 4. Below we show that our results are robust to the choice of different bandwidths.
One way to present our estimates of m(PI, I2, I3) is through a series of two dimensional graphs,
where in the y-axis we represent the outcome of interest, and in the x-axis we represent one of
the income variables in m(PI, I2, I3). The advantage of this presentation is that the graphs are
straightforward to read. The downside of this type of presentation is that it allows variation of only
one income period at a time, which means that we need to fix the remaining two income variables at
some pre-determined values (we fix the remaining control variables at their mean values). Therefore,
we use multiple figures for each outcome, corresponding to different pre-determined values for the
left-out income variables in each graph.
For each outcome, we present three sets of graphs. In the first set, we fix PI and I3 at three
different values each (the third, fifth, and seventh deciles of the distribution of each variable), and
vary only I2, for a total of nine possible combinations. These are presented in nine different panels,
which plot m(PI, I2, I3) against I2 (for given values of PI and I3). At the top of each panel we
display the values at which we are fixing PI and I3.
14In appendix Figure A2a and A2b we report results for the remaining non-schooling outcomes available in our data.
There is no a consistent pattern across different outcomes, perhaps because they correspond to different skills. The
IQ graphs display what seems to be an inverse-U shape, both for income at 6-11 and at 12-17, although they have a
fairly long increasing section. When we look at log earnings at age 30 the shapes of the graphs are quite different.
Child earnings are decreasing with income at ages 6-11, which says that shifting money away from the first period and
towards the second period of childhood results in worse labor market outcomes for the child. Child earnings are roughly
increasing in income at ages 12-17. With regard to teenage pregnancy, there is not much of a gradient with income
at 6-11, and a pronounced and declining relationship with income at 12-17. This suggests that positive income shocks
in the last period of childhood may be particularly important to prevent teenage pregnancy. In terms of self-reported
adult health it also seems to be beneficial to shift income towards late childhood. Finally, when we examine grades in
high school, it is useful to shift income from ages 6-11 to ages 0-5, indicating that the early years are important. But
at the same time it is also important to shift income towards ages 12-17. Notice that, when analyzing grades in high
school, we increased the size of the bins over which we evaluate (PIi, Ii2, Ii3) (we do this in Figures A1 and A2). This
is because the sample size is so much smaller for this outcome than for the remaining ones.
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Since PI = I1 + I2 + I3, when PI and I3 are fixed at particular values, we cannot vary I1 and I2
independently. Therefore, by moving towards the right along the x-axis in each graph, we are able
to see how the outcome varies as I1 increases and, simultaneously, I2 decreases (i.e., as income is
“shifted” from period 1 to period 2). The support of I2 over which we can evaluate m(PI, I2, I3) is
not the same across all panels because, for different combinations of PI and I3, there are values of I2
for which there are no observations in the sample. The second set of panels keeps PI and I2 fixed,
and lets I3 vary (a “shift” in income from period 1 to period 3). The third set of panels keeps PI
and I1 fixed and varies I3 (a “shift” in income from period 2 to period 3).
Below each panel we display two other parameters, α1 and α2(and respective standard errors),
which are defined as follows. For each panel, let H be the highest grid point for the income variable
being used in that panel, let L be the lowest grid point, andM be the median grid point (corresponding
to the 50th percentile of the distribution of that income variable in that panel). Take the case where
we fix PI = PI and I3 = I3, and we let I2 vary. Then define:
α1 = m(PI,M, I3)−m(PI, L, I3) (7)
α2 = m(PI,H, I3)−m(PI,M, I3).
α1 is the difference between the values the outcome takes in the median and lower extreme of the
support of I2, while α2 is the difference between the values the outcome takes in the median and
upper extreme of the support of I2. If m(PI, I2, I3) did not vary with I2 (in which case the timing
of income would be irrelevant, at least when we compare first and second period incomes) we would
expect α1 = α2 = 0, so these parameters help us quantify the importance of the timing of income.
4.2.1 Years of Schooling
In Figures 3ai)-jiii) we represent the relationship between years of schooling of the child and (PI, I2, I3).
We begin with Figures 3ai)-ciii), showing how years of schooling change with I2, relative to I1. At
the top of each panel we display the values at which we keep PI and I3 fixed, which are either the
third, fifth or seventh deciles of the distributions of each of these variables.
Each panel shows two lines. The solid line (with the dashed standard errors) corresponds to
m(PI, I2, I3), where PI and I3 are the conditioning values for PI and I3. The scale of this line is
given on the vertical axis located on the left side of the graph. The dotted line, which is declining in
every panel, corresponds to the income in the left out period of childhood. In this case, it is equal to
I1 = PI − I3 − I2. The scale of this line can be read on the vertical axis located on the right side of
the graph.
It is remarkable that all of the figures in panels 3ai)-ciii) display an inverse-U shape. Recall that
this is the same pattern that we get from the estimation of the parametric model of equation (6), as
shown in Figure 2. We compute α1 and α2 for each panel, and for all cases we reject the hypothesis
that these parameters are equal to zero (i.e., we reject that these lines are flat).
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What this means is that, across different values of PI and I3, the years of schooling of the child
are maximized when there is some balance between early and middle childhood income. If income
is too concentrated in either early or middle childhood, then one can improve education outcomes
of children by “shifting” income towards the other period. The (discounted annual) level of I2 at
which the maximum is achieved is roughly between £8,000 and £12,000 (it increases with I3), which
is generally above the median level of I2 for each graph.
These results have two important implications. First, the timing of income shocks is relevant
for human capital formation. If the timing of income was irrelevant then all these graphs would be
horizontal lines, with only permanent income being relevant for human capital outcomes. It is likely
that the timing of income shocks affects the timing of investments in human capital (which in turn
affects human capital formation). This will happen if parents have imperfect insurance possibilities
against income shocks.
Second, if the timing of income matters because parental investments react to income shocks, the
shape of the curves in panels 3ai)-ciii) is consistent with an underlying technology of skill formation
that exhibits complementarity in investments across periods. The reason is that, under complemen-
tarity, it is desirable to maintain a balanced flow of investments over the life of the child.
It is especially interesting that there is an upward sloping section in each curve. One could imagine
that, for a given level of permanent income, it should not be worse to receive the bulk of one’s lifetime
family income in the first period, instead of having it spread out over different periods of childhood. If
permanent income is fully available at the beginning of childhood then one should be able to allocate
it freely across periods just by saving the appropriate amount, regardless of whether or not one can
borrow. However, this reasoning ignores uncertainty about income. When faced with income shocks,
parents change their investments in children, unless they have perfect insurance. Savings alone do
not generally provide perfect insurance.
We show below that, in a model with income uncertainty, it is possible to have an upward sloping
section in these curves. But we also show that uncertainty about the parameters of the technology
of skill formation (or about the ability of the child), combined with learning about these parameters,
also leads to an upward sloping curve.
It is useful to compare the upward and downward slopes in the different panels of Figure 3, with
the slope of the relationship between years of schooling and permanent income, shown in Figure 2.
The slopes of the curves in Figures 3ai)-ciii) are roughly half of those shown in Figure 2. For example,
a £100,000 increase in permanent earnings leads to about an extra 0.5 years of education, while an
increase in middle childhood’s income from £0 to £100,000 leads to about an extra 0.25 years of
education. This means that, although the impact of the timing of income is smaller than that of
permanent income, it is still quite substantial.
Figures 3di)-fiii) examine trade-offs between early and late childhood income (keeping fixed income
in middle childhood and permanent income) and show a similar inverse-U shape, although it is
less pronounced that in the previous figures. Some of the graphs display curves that are mainly
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monotonically increasing such as, for example, Figure 3diii). In addition, while α1 is usually positive
and significantly different from zero, α2 is often negative but not statistically different from zero, so
schooling appears to be higher when income occurs in late rather than early childhood.
Figures 3gi)-jiii) examine trade-offs between income in middle and late childhood (keeping fixed
income in early childhood and permanent income). Although most of these figures still display an
inverse-U shape, there also cases where the most robust pattern in these figures is a declining one
(indicating that schooling is higher when income occurs in middle rather than in late childhood). We
come back to the economic interpretation of these patterns below, when we simulate different models
of income shocks, parental investments and child outcomes.
4.2.2 High School Drop Out and College Attendance
Instead of years of schooling, it is useful to consider high school dropout rates and college attendance
rates separately, since they correspond to education decisions at the lower tail and at the upper tail
of the education distribution. Perhaps not surprisingly, these results are quite similar to the ones we
showed for years of education. Therefore, to save on space, we show only three figures per outcome,
corresponding to fixing the omitted variables at their median values (which are analogous to Figures
3bii, 3eii, and 3hii). The full set of figures is shown in the appendix, in Figures A3 and A4.
High school dropout rates are minimized, and college attendance rates are maximized, when
incomes are balanced between the early and middle childhood years (periods 1 and 2; see Figures 4a
and 5a), keeping permanent income and income in late childhood (period 3) fixed. When we increase
income in late childhood, educational outcomes appear to improve when this is done at the expense
of early childhood income (Figures 4b and 5b), but it is less clear what happens when this is at the
expense of middle childhood income (Figures 4c and 5c): while we still have a roughly U-shaped
curve for high school dropout, in the case of college the relationship between the outcome and income
in the third period of childhood is monotonically decreasing.
Again, we can clearly reject that these curves are flat, by computing both α1 and α2 for each panel.
The magnitudes of these impacts are substantial. An increase in permanent income of £100,000 is
associated with roughly a 10% decline in high school dropout rates and a 10% increase in college
attendance rates. In comparison, a £100,000 shift in income from period 1 to period 2 leads roughly
to a 4% decrease in high school dropout and a 6% increase in college attendance.
4.2.3 Other Outcomes
We present a series of semi-parametric estimates for other outcomes in the Appendix. We start
with log annual earnings at age 30, which is especially interesting because of its importance for
intergenerational mobility literature, which usually focuses on the relationship between parental and
child incomes. These are shown in Figure A5. Keeping PI and I3 fixed, shifting income away from
period 1 and towards period 2 leads to a sharp reduction in log earnings, followed by a flattening
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of the relationship. Shifting income toward the late childhood and away from early childhood years
leads to increases in log earnings at age 30. These patterns are similar to the ones we documented
for college education.
However, there is not much movement in earnings when we consider shifts in income from the
middle to late period of childhood, which is not true for any of the education variables we considered.
Any difference between these figures and the ones displayed above for education could be due to
the existence of an unobserved dimension of human capital, which affects earnings, and which is
influenced by parental investments.
The slopes of the estimated curves are remarkably steep. For low values of I1, a £100,000 shift in
income from I1 to I2 (keeping PI and I3 fixed) leads to a 5-15% decline in wages. A shift of £100,000
in I1 towards I3 generates gains in earnings close to 5%. These figures are very large, especially in
light of the fact that a £100,000 increase in PI is associated with a 10% increase in log earnings at
age 30.
Looking to IQ, and examining the trade-off between I1 and I2 (Figures A6ai)-ciii)), and I1 and I3
(Figures A6di)-fiii)), the results suggest that it is beneficial to shift income away from early childhood,
either towards the middle childhood or late childhood years, which is in contrast with the results we
have had so far. However, when we study the trade-off I2 and I3 (Figures A6gi)-jiii)), the results
indicate that shifting income towards late childhood is associated with lower levels of IQ.
With regards to health, and in contrast to what we have seen so far, the curves are quite flat,
or they do not show a clear pattern. We cannot reject that most curves in Figures A7ai)-ciii), and
in Figures A7di)-fiii), are flat lines. The results are less consistent across panels A7gi)-jiii). The
estimates are also relatively more imprecise in this case than for the outcomes studied so far.
Figures A8ai)-jiii) show that teenage pregnancy is minimized when there is a balance between
I1 and I2, and when there is a shift in income from I1 to I3, or, in some cases, from I2 and I3.
Nevertheless, because teenage pregnancy is only observed for females, and that it is a relatively
infrequent phenomenon, these estimates are more imprecise than the ones presented above for other
outcomes.
Unfortunately the nonparametric results for grades in school are too imprecise to be informative
and they are available upon request. The parametric graphs corresponding to this outcome and
shown in the last panels of Figure 2 are more precise. They show that grades decline as income is
shifted from period 1 to period 2 of the child’s life. And they increase when one shifts income from
period 1 to period 3.
In sum, the patterns we document for schooling are often different from the patterns we document
for other outcomes. The most likely explanation, as suggested above, is that there are multiple skills
that are important for different adult outcomes, and which may be impacted by the timing of income
in a different way. Additional research is needed to understand them in more detail. In this paper
we focus on schooling, because of its importance in the human capital literature. One reason for
not having an equally strong focus to earnings is that our observations of earnings are limited, and
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restricted to fairly young workers (since we only consider children born in the decade between 1970
and 1980).
5 The Endogeneity of the Timing of Income Shocks
In our main empirical specification we cannot be certain that the error term is orthogonal to the
timing of income, even after controlling for permanent income. Although we mentioned this problem
above, below we discuss in detail two challenges to interpreting our estimates of the impact of the
timing of income on the education of children as causal, which are related and driven by parental
heterogeneity.
First, the timing of income could be a choice variable, potentially correlated with human capital
investments. One obvious case is maternity leave: parents choose to take time off at the beginning
of the child’s life, presumably with the goal of improving the outcomes of the child (e.g., Carneiro,
Lø ken, and Salvanes (2015)). More generally, there may be particular time periods when parents
take time off to improve the life chances of children.
Second, there may be unobserved traits of individuals which are potentially correlated with human
capital investments and with income profiles. Those parents who have their income frontloaded in
the early years of the life of the child could be different from those who have their income backloaded.
The question is: in which ways are they different?15
It is difficult to fully address endogeneity concerns without an external source of exogenous vari-
ation for the timing of income.16 Therefore, we employ alternative empirical strategies to deal with
this issue, and diagnose the degree to which it is important.
It is illuminating to begin by examining one particular child outcome: birth weight. One impli-
cation of our assumptions is that post-birth income fluctuations should not predict pre-birth invest-
ments, unless they are correlated with permanent traits of parents, which would have independent
effects on all the outcomes we consider. Therefore, we examine the relationship between the timing of
income and an indicator for low birth weight. Birth weight is strongly correlated with our permanent
income measure.
We find that the timing of income fluctuations does not predict whether a child is low birth weight
(even though permanent income is strongly correlated with low birth weight). Figures 6a-c present
results from a semi-parametric regression of an indicator variable for low birthweight on (PI, I2, I3)
and other controls. As above, we show only three figures, corresponding to fixing the omitted variables
at their median values (which are analogous to Figures 3bii, 3eii, and 3hii). The full set of figures is
shown in the appendix, in Figures A9. For almost all panels, it is not possible to reject that these lines
15Parental education affects the slope of income profiles and the outcomes of children, but this is a variable we will
control for.
16One candidate would be local labor market shocks, but when we implemented the (control function) estimator the
resulting estimates were very imprecise.
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are flat (based on our estimates of α1 and α2), suggesting that the timing of income is uncorrelated
with permanent unobserved parental quality, affecting both their choices about the timing of income,
or affecting their income profiles.
Notice also that in all our previous estimates we use paternal income as our measure of income.
We do this because father’s income is likely to be more stable than mother’s income, and less subject
to changes in labor supply due to child-rearing activities. It is however possible that, for some fathers,
labor supply choices are also affected by child-rearing activities. Therefore, Figures 7a-c) re-estimate
equation (3) using only paternal income, but excluding income in years 0-2. These again focus on
three panels and full results are displayed in appendix Figures A10ai-jiii). The effect of the timing of
income is estimated now defining income in the three periods as 3-7, 8-12 and 13-17 with permanent
income defined as the sum across these periods.
The results show that if anything, there is even a more pronounced curvature in the inverse u-
shape relationship between the two variables. The main difference relative to our previous results
occurs when we examine shifts in income from the early to the late childhood period. The curves
display a much stronger inverse-U shape than before.
Additional family-specific unobserved preferences for child-rearing might be correlated with the
timing of income. For example, parents can have certain preferences for the quality of child care
or schools, and may choose to work more intensively in the early years to fulfill these preferences.
Exploring only within family variation will allow us to account for all family specific heterogeneity,
which is constant across siblings. We implement the within family estimator just by adding family
indicators to our regressions, and relying on variation in the timing of income and outcomes across
siblings. Figure A11 in the appendix plots within family parametric regressions and the general
patterns, even though noisier, are inverse U-shape17
5.1 Heterogeneous Age-Earnings Profiles
To address the two main concerns listed above we adopt three additional strategies. First, it could
be that paternal incomes are front-loaded or backloaded as a consequence of heterogeneous human
capital. We already have a large set of controls for heterogeneous human capital, including PI.
However, we further address this concern by estimating paternal income shocks in a first step, where
we take the residuals of a regression of paternal income on a full set of age-education dummies, and a
paternal fixed effect. This is especially useful if PI and the remaining father specific controls are not
enough to account for time invariant unobservables for the father. In a second step, we re-estimate
equation (3) using these residuals to compute our measure of income at each age, instead of the actual
paternal income values.18 The three panels in Figures 8a-c (and full results in Appendix A12ai)-jiii))
17We only present the parametric estimates, because we do not have enough data to reliably estimate a semi-
parametric model with family fixed-effects.
18Father fixed effects are not included in the second step model, unlike what was done to generate Figure A11, so this
is not estimated using only within family variation. We use the father fixed effects solely in the first step construction
19
show a clear pattern of the inverse u-shaped curves which are significant in each figure.
Second, it could be that heterogeneous income profiles are driven by unobserved individual-specific
life-time income trends. Our main specification controls for the income profile of fathers by calculating
the difference between income post-childhood (using age 18-20) and pre-childhood (three years prior
to birth). In Figures 9a-c,19 we add to our specificiation the growth in income during the pre-birth
years, and the growth in income in the post-childhood years. The results displayed are similar to the
ones in our main specification.
Third, any remaining endogeneity in income profiles could be related to heterogeneity in the
variance of income. Recall that our estimates show that balanced profiles of income are optimal to
maximise child human capital. There is a possibility that could be partly driven by a model where
parents with less volatile income profiles are “better” parents than those with fluctuating income
profiles. We therefore include a measure of income variance as an additional control in the main
semi-parametric regressions. In order to compute it we first run a regression of fathers’ income on
dummy variables for education and age. For each individual, we then calculate the error term in each
period, and calculate an individual specific variance of income (across periods). Again, as shown in
Figures 10a-c (and Figures A14 in the Appendix) the resulting estimates are similar to those in the
rest of the paper.
It is however true that, even if we can convincingly tackle the issues discussed here, we will not be
able to rule out the possibility that we are capturing the effect of the timing of other shocks, which are
correlated with the timing of income shocks (such as, for example, parental illness). In that case, we
would have to interpret our estimates more broadly as giving us the impact of the timing of parental
shocks, which could include income shocks, but also other shocks correlated with shocks to income.
5.2 Other Robustness Checks
In the appendix we present additional checks to the sensitivity of our estimates. First, as discussed
in section 2, we have used a fixed discount rate to construct our measures of per period income and
permanent income. In order to address concerns that the chosen discount rate is not appropriate
for our panel, we re-estimate the model using different fixed rates (0%,2%,4%,6%,10%,15%), and we
also re-estimate the model using time-varying discount rates using official real interest rates data
for Norway between 1971 and 1998. In all the cases the main shapes of the figures we focus on are
preserved, as shown in Figures A15.
Second, we check the robustness of the results to bandwidth choice, either by reducing (Figures
A16ai-jiii) or increasing (Figures A17ai-jiii) the bandwidth. Using equation (4), the bandwidth used
in our main results is defined by setting C equal to 4, so here we also set C = 2 and then C = 6.
Estimates using the smaller bandwidth are more noisy, as expected. But the general patterns of our
of income shocks.
19Again, for simplicity we display only three panels. The full set of panels are shown in Appendix Figures A13.
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results remain essentially unchanged.
Third, we control additionally for marital status and the number of children in the household.
These are likely to be correlated with the timing of family income and with child outcomes. However,
they are also potentially endogenous to family income and therefore were excluded from the origi-
nal specification. Figures A18ai-jiii) show similar patterns than those found when we include only
exogenous controls, albeit the emergence of more pronounced inverse u-shaped curves when shifting
income between period 2 and 3.
Fourth, in the main specification in the paper we take income from biological fathers, irrespective
of marital break up and further family formation. However, this may not be the relevant measure of
income if, for example, mothers re-marry, in which case income from the non-biological father could
become the main income source. The sample in Figures A19ai)-jiii) selects only families which do
not experience marital break-up. Again, the patterns are remarkably similar to those in our main
specification.
To summarize, the conclusions of our paper are robust to a range of checks for our identification
strategy and specification of the human capital equation. Where we do find deviations, it tends to be
in the direction that the robustness checks find stronger evidence of inverse-U shaped relationships
between the timing of parental income and the child’s education.
6 Simple Models that Explain our Findings
Why and how does the timing of income drive human capital formation of children? In this section
we attempt to address this question by simulating simple dynamic models of parental investments
in children, which are able to produce an inverse-U relationship between the human capital of the
child, and a shift in income from the first to the second, from the second to the third, and from
the first to the third periods of childhood. At the same time, some of these models are also able to
generate increasing relationships between years of schooling and a shifts in income from the first to
the third period of childhood. Such models would be consistent with the main empirical findings of
this paper regarding years of schooling, although they could also be used to interpret our results for
other outcomes.
For example, one could think that the downward sloping section of the relationship between
years of schooling and I2 (after controlling for PI and I3) is driven by credit constraints. If the
technology of skill formation exhibits complementarity in investments across periods, and if credit
constrained parents cannot borrow funds from the future, then the level of investments during the
early childhood could be sub-optimal. In that case, one could increase it with a shift in income
towards early childhood, leading to an increase in human capital.
It is also interesting that there is an upward sloping section in each curve. One would think that,
for a given level of permanent income, it should not be worse to have all income available in the
first period, than to receive it in payments spread out over different periods of childhood. This is
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because, if permanent income becomes fully available at time zero, then one can allocate it freely
across periods just by saving the appropriate amount, regardless of whether or not one can borrow.
However, the reasoning just described ignores the possibility that parents face multiple sources of
uncertainty when they make investment decisions. One of them is income uncertainty. When faced
with income shocks, parents change their investments in children, unless they have perfect insurance.
Savings alone cannot provide perfect insurance. Another one is uncertainty about the ability of the
child or about the technology of skill formation. If parents are not sure about the ability of the child,
parents may want to postpone investment until more of this uncertainty is revealed (see Altonji,
Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1997)).
We discuss these ideas in detail in this section, where we simulate different models of parental
investments in children, and examine their implications for the impact of the timing of income shocks
on human capital formation.20
6.1 The Basic Model
6.1.1 Preferences
We assume that there is a single parent and a single child, and parents have the following instantaneous
preferences for consumption:
u(ct) =
c1−σt
1− σ (8)
where ct is per-period parent consumption and σ the degree of relative risk aversion.
Asset accumulation is described by the standard budget constraint
at+1 = (1 + r)at + it − pxt − ct (9)
where at is the current stock of assets in t, and it is income in t, p is the relative price between
investment and consumption (assumed to be constant over time), and xtdenotes investment in children
in period t.
We add heterogeneity to the model to match the support of child’s schooling attainment and
per-period parental incomes found in the data. We include three equally sized groups of individuals,
20We could further enrich our model with additional realistic features. For example, another issue we should consider
is time as a parental investment. Time and good investments can be complementary or substitutable, and the elasticity
of substitution between these two types of investment may change with age. Investments in periods 1 and 2 of the
child’s life could be complements, but the aggregate of the two could be substitutable with investments in the last
period of the child’s life. Furthermore, there may be issues related to preferences. For example, the parent’s objective
function may include other arguments beyond child’s schooling, so depending on how the marginal rate of substitution
between parental consumption and investments in children changes with the child’s age, delayed parental income could
lead to higher investments in children. We have accounted for these factors in other simulations, not presented in the
paper, but the goal here is only to present the simplest set of models that could explain our empirical findings, and
tell us about the main economic forces behind them.
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defining their income profiles as increasing, decreasing, and flat. The income process is given by:
ikt = wmin + wk exp(εt) (10)
where k denotes type, εt is an iid income shock, the type-specific wage slope on this shock is wk, and
wmin is a minimum level of income.
6.1.2 The technology of skill formation
We consider a CES production function, where human capital at age t+ 1, yt+1, is a function of the
current human capital stock, yt, and investment in children, xt:
yt+1 = δ
[
γty
φ
t + (1− γt)xφt
] ρ
φ
(11)
Under this specification, γt is the self-productivity of human capital (see Cunha, Heckman, and
Schennach (2010)), ρ denotes the degree of concavity of the production function and φ measures the
degree of complementarity of investments across periods (1/1 − φ is the elasticity of substitution).
Finally, δ is a scaling parameter that maps skills to observed human capital measures (such as years
of schooling).
Each individual is born with an initial endowment of human capital, y0,k, which varies with type.
6.1.3 The household problem
At the beginning of each period, parents know their assets, the current income shocks, and the
child’s level of skill (this assumption will be relaxed later). They then decide on the optimal level of
consumption and investments in children, after forming expectations about the future. Parents cannot
perfectly predict future income shocks, but they know their distribution. Parents also face a budget
constraint, the technology of skill formation (which is assumed to be known for now), borrowing
constraints, and (for simplicity) they are unable to leave financial bequests to their children. The
recursive formulation of the parental problem is the following:
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Vt(yt, at, εt) = Maxct,xt
 c1−σt1− σ + β
ˆ
εt+1
[Vt+1(y
′, a′, ε′)|Ωt] dε
 (12)
s.to.
ct + pxt + at+1 = it + (1 + r)at
it,k = wmin + wke
εt
yt+1 = δ
[
γty
φ
t + (1− γt)xφt
]ρ/φ
ct, xt, aT > 0
at > −a
VT (yT , aT , εT ) = η
(yT )
1−σ
1− σ + ϕ [(1− exp(−aT )]
where VT (yT , aT , εT ) is the terminal value function, and represents the parental valuation of the skills
acquired by children when they become adults (η) and assets (ϕ).
This simple model can be solved computationally. For our simulations, we fix parameters for pref-
erences, the terminal value function, and the budget constraint to a set of arbitrary values (loosely
informed by the available literature on similar models), and we then estimate the technology param-
eters to fit the data relating income fluctuations and the timing of income.21 We simulate results
incorporating different assumptions about borrowing constraints (below we show the results for the
assumption that a = 0). The parameters for which we fix values, and their description, is shown in
Table 2.
6.2 Solution and Estimation
The model is solved numerically. Standard quadrature methods are used to integrate the value
functions over the known distribution of income shocks. Obtaining values for the expected value
function (EVt+1) also involves the approximation of this function at states lying outside the grid
of assets and human capital, since they evolve continuously, and are governed by the dynamics
of the budget constraint and the technology of skill formation. EVt+1 is approximated by using
Cheyshev Polynomials, which allow us to evaluate the optimal investment and savings decisions in
each state of the world, and in each particular period.22 The resulting policy functions (x(yt, at, εt)
and a′(yt, at, εt)), are then used to simulate data from 100,000 random draws of income shocks, which
21It is not possible to estimate all parameters of the model. The model is not identified. Therefore we have proceeded
by taking standard values for some parameters from the literature, and estimated the remaining ones. Notice that the
goal of this section is to search for possible models that could be used to explain the main empirical patterns uncovered
in this paper, as opposed to uncovering the unique model that justifies what we see in the data. Therefore, for our
purpose, we believe that our procedure is adequate.
22More details of the approximation procedure are shown in Appendix 1.
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are useful to build a large simulated dataset of incomes and human capital.
The estimation procedure adopted is Simulated Method of Moments (Gourieroux et al (2005),
McFadden (1989)). The method consists in computing a set of moments with both actual and simu-
lated data, and finding the structural parameters that minimize the sum of the quadratic distances
between them. Denote the set of data moments by α, and the set of simulated (which depend on the
structural parameters) by αs(θ). The structural parameters θ = {φ, γt, δ} are found by solving the
following minimization problem:
Minθ(α− αs(θ))W (α− αs(θ)))
where W is a weighting matrix. The set of moments chosen for estimation includes the mean value
of years of schooling at percentiles 10, 25, 50, 75 and 90 of each per-period income. We use as a
weighting matrix the diagonal of the optimal weighting matrix, which is computed using the standard
errors of the income percentiles from the data:
W = diag(V CV (α)−1)
where V CV (α) is the Variance-covariance matrix of the set of data moments to be matched by the
simulations.
Finally, using this set of estimated (and calibrated) parameters, we simulate per-period incomes,
permanent income, and optimal human capital. We then use local linear regressions to estimate the
relationship between human capital and income in different ages using simulated data, which are
useful to construct two-dimensional graphs analogous to those shown in section 4.2. This allows us to
check whether we can reproduce the main patterns shown in the figures in section 4.2 using simulated
data from the models described in this section.
6.3 Simulations with income uncertainty
Our estimates of the parameters of the technology of skill formation are shown in Table 3, for a basic
model where parents only face income shocks. Self-productivity parameters γt are roughly between
0.45 and 0.6 across periods, suggesting that the current stock of human capital is roughly as important
as investments in children. The production function is concave since ρ < 1, and there is evidence
of dynamic complementarity because i) the estimated elasticity of substitution is 1/(1 − φ) = 1.7);
and ii) at the optimum, cross derivatives δ
2yt+1
δxiδxj
are always larger than zero (indicating dynamic
complementarity), for all combinations of periods i and j.
Using data simulated from our model, we analyze the relationship between human capital and
the timing of income shocks, by constructing two-dimensional graphs analogous to those in section
4.2. These are shown in Figures 11. There are only three panels. In 11a we fix PI and I3 at their
median values, and examine the relationship between Y and I2. In panel 11b we fix PI and I2 at
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their median values, and examine the relationship between Y and I3. In panel 11c we fix PI and
I1 at their median values, and examine the relationship between Y and I3. The full set of figures is
shown in the appendix, in Figures A20. Across all panels (in the text and in the appendix) the shape
of the figures is an inverse-U, which means that, in the model, schooling is maximized when income
is balanced across periods.
Our model allows us not only to describe the relationship between human capital and the timing
of income, but also how we can understand this relationship by studying the impact of the timing
of income on consumption, savings, and investments in children. In particular, we can ask how
movements in these variables can potentially account for the inverse-U patterns of Figure 3.
If parents are credit constrained and they face income uncertainty, optimal investments react to
income shocks. This is shown in Figures 12 and 13, where we show how investments in children
and savings change with the timing of income. Again we consider only three panels for investments
in children, and three panels for savings, where we evaluate the omitted income variables at their
median values.
Panel 12a indicates that, as income shifts away from early to middle childhood (0-5 to 6-11),
early investments (x1) decrease, investments in middle childhood (x2) increase, and investments in
adolescence (x3) are unresponsive. Panel 12b indicates a similar behavior of investments when income
is shifted from early childhood to adolescence (where middle-childhood income remains constant). In
that case, early childhood investments (x1) decrease, while investments in adolescence (x3) sharply
increase. Investments in middle childhood (x1) are fairly unresponsive in this simulation. Finally,
panel 12c shows that when income is shifted from middle childhood to adolescence, investments in
middle childhood and adolescence are also responsive in the expected direction, while investments in
early childhood do not change once again.
Given the simple monotonic relationships between current income and investments in children
(and savings), the inverse-U patterns of Figure 3 could be partly due to dynamic complementarity
in the production function. The mechanism would be as speculated above: income shocks induce
changes in investments in children, but an unbalanced path of child investments produces less human
capital than a balanced path of investments, because of dynamic complementarity.
In Table 4, we check the robustness of our estimates of technology parameters to different choices of
values for the remaining parameters of the model. In all cases the estimated elasticities of substitution
of investments across different periods suggest that there is dynamic complementarity.
6.4 Uncertainty about Child Ability, or about the Parameters of the
Technology
There is a growing literature documenting the importance of parental subjective expectations, for
example regarding the parameters of the production function of skill, for parental investments (e.g.,
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Cunha, Elo, and Culhane (2013)).23 We now show that if we incorporate uncertainty about the
technology into our model and allow parents to learn about the technology as children age, the human
capital of children may increase as we shift income to later ages even with dynamic complementarity
in the production function and in the presence of borrowing constraints. This could help explain
some of the patterns shown in section 4.2.
We consider a slight change in the technology of skill formation, by adding technology shocks of
the form;
yt+1 = δ
[
γty
φ
t + (1− γt)xφt
] ρ
φ
+ τ + νt (13)
where τ takes only two possible values and is fixed over time, and νt ∼ N(0, σ2vt). This implies that
we introduce a new dimension of heterogeneity in the model, τ , which can only take a high and a
low value and which is not observed by the parents. Assuming that parents know the remaining
parameters of the production function, they observe τ+νt at the end of each period and then use this
information in the following period’s decision. We postulate a very simplistic (non-bayesian) learning
model where the parent’s best guess for τ is their observation of τ+νt in the previous period. Parents
do however know the value of σ2vt each period. We assume that σ
2
vt decreases over time, in order to
keep the simplicity of the learning process and still capture the possibility that parents have a better
idea of τ at later ages than at earlier ages.
In contrast to income shocks presented in the basic model, technology shocks νt are not part of
the state space. This means that, when parents decide consumption and investments, they are not
certain about the human capital of their children. However, parents do have a belief about τ , τˆ ,
which is equal to zero for everyone in period 0, and equal to yt− δ
[
γt−1y
φ
t−1 + (1− γt−1)xφt−1
] ρ
φ
in the
remaining periods. τˆ is an additional state variable in the model. Parents know however that τˆ is a
measure of τ contaminated with measurement error, which has variance σ2vt.
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These ideas are captured by the following recursive specification:
Vt(yt, at, εt, τˆ) = Maxct,xtEνt
{
c1−σt
1−σ + βEεt+1 [Vt+1(y
′, a′, ε′, τˆ ′)|, ht, at, εt] | at, εt
}
Under this formulation, technology shocks can also be interpreted as uncertainty about the child’s
ability, τ . In this case parents do not know their child’s ability before deciding consumption and
investments, which is captured by the new expectation operator over technology shocks. Their knowl-
edge of the world at the end of period t is limited to their assets, the current income shock, and last
period’s estimate of τ , forming probabilistic distributions of child’s human capital.
Figure 14 has three panels where we depict the relationship between human capital and income
in a given period using simulated data from this model, keeping permanent income and income in
23Empirical literature on the relationship between knowledge and expectations about the state of the world and
actual behavior includes Aizer and Stroud (2010), Glied and Lleras-Muney (2008), and Roy (2009).
24We realize this is a very naive and unsophisticated way of modelling beliefs and learning. The reason we do it is
because it leads to models which are very easy to compute, and at the same time, are able to illustrate the main points
we are making.
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one other period fixed at their median values, just as we did before. In appendix Figure A21 we
display the full set of figures for these simulations. Across panels, human capital increases as income
is shifted to future periods of life of the child. In this model, parents seem to delay investments to a
period where they face less uncertainty about the ability of the child (or about the technology).
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the importance of the timing of income shocks for the human capital develop-
ment of children. Using a very large dataset, consisting of the entire population of children born in
Norway between 1971 and 1980, we estimate semi-parametric regressions of human capital outcomes
of children (measured in their adult years), on the average discounted father’s income for the years
when the child was between 0 and 17 years of age (which we label permanent income), and on income
in different periods.
We find that the education of the child is maximized when fathers experience a stable and bal-
anced flow of income across the first 17 years of life of the child. This is observed in fairly simple,
additively separable, two variable regression models, as well as in much more complex and flexible
semi-parametric models. However, this pattern is not consistent across different outcomes, which may
indicate the importance of considering explicitly multiple skills in our models of the labor market.
We simulate simple models of parental investments in children which are able to explain our
findings. These models are not the only ones consistent with our data, but they build very naturally
on much of the central literature on this topic (e.g., Becker and Tomes (1986), Cunha, Heckman, and
Schennach (2010)). In addition, they have enough richness to enable them to predict our empirical
results fairly well.
Our simulations show a simple model of parental investments in children, where parents invest
in different periods of development of the child, while they face income shocks and imperfect credit
markets. The production function of skill is a CES function, where investments in children in different
time periods are complementary inputs.
In this model, investments in children react to income shocks but there is only imperfect insurance
against shocks. Since investments in children are complements over time, education is maximized
when there is a balanced flow of investments. Since investments react to income shocks, a pattern
of stable income leads to a pattern of stable investments. This is consistent with our finding that
human capital of children is maximized when parents face a balanced flow of income.
We also consider models which add uncertainty and learning about either the child’s ability, or
the technology of skill formation, albeit in a very simplistic way. Such models are able to account for
an increasing relationship between human capital of the child, and a shift in income away from the
early years and towards the late adolescent years of the child.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Standard Deviation
Paternal Income Period 1, Age 0-5 522,490 11.83 4.23
Paternal Income Period 2, Age 6-11 522,490 10.25 4.41
Paternal Income Period 3, Age 12-17 522,490 8.53 4.68
Paternal Permanent Income, Age 0-17 522,490 30.61 11.69
Mother Years of Schooling 522,490 11.14 2.71
Father Years of Schooling 522,490 11.45 3.02
Mother Age at Birth 522,490 26.26 5.03
Father Age at Birth 522,490 29.02 5.74
Child Year of Birth 522,490 1975.29 2.88
Years of Schooling 520,752 12.73 2.41
High School Dropout 522,490 0.21 0.41
College Attendance 522,490 0.39 0.49
Log Earnings age 30 307,776 9.90 0.81
IQ (males only) 248,801 5.25 1.79
Health (males only) 265,959 8.44 1.52
Teenage Pregnancy (females only) 249,540 0.08 0.28
Grades 48,384 42.75 10.62
Note: Income and earnings variables in 2000 prices, £ 10,000s.
Table 2: Set of Calibrated Structural Parameters
Parameter Value
Risk Aversion (σ) 0.5
Discount factor (β) 0.96
Interest rate (r) 0.5
Credit Constraint (−a) 0
Relative price investment/consumption (p) 1
Parental valuation of child’s human capital (η) 12
Parental valuation of assets when children become adults (ϕ) 12
Minimum wage (wmin) 1
Wage slopes by type (wk) {7,7.65,11}
Variance of income shocks (σ2ε) 0.1
Initial endowment (H0,k) {1,1,0282,1.0483}
Note: The table shows the set of structural parameters that were calibrated for our
simulations. The sensitivity of our results to different calibrations is shown below.
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Table 3: Estimated Structural Parameters
Parameter Estimates
γ1 0.5991
γ2 0.4602
γ3 0.6194
φ 0.4282
ρ 0.7487
δ 2.23
Note: The table shows the estimated parameters for the technology of skill formation
presented in equation11
Table 4: Sensitivity of the Estimated Structural Parameters
Parameter Benchmark No Credit
Con-
straints
(a = −∞)
Low Elasticity
of
Consumption
(σ = 0.95)
High Elasticity
of
Consumption
(σ = 0.1)
High valuation of
child’s human
capital relative to
assets ( η
τ
= 5)
Low valuation of
child’s human
capital ( η
τ
= 0.2)
γ1 0.59 0.39 0.54 0.37 0.48 0.42
γ2 0.46 0.69 0.48 0.53 0.63 0.53
γ3 0.62 0.56 0.63 0.70 0.73 0.43
φ 0.43 -0.31 -0.36 0.30 0.49 0.50
ρ 0.75 0.52 0.58 0.71 0.69 0.49
δ 2.23 2.97 3.60 2.45 3.03 2.56
1/(1− φ) 1.75 0.76 0.73 1.42 2 2
Note: The table shows the sensitivity of the estimated technology of skill formation under
different combinations of the calibrated parameters in table 2
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